Interpretation in Augustine's De Doctrina
This is the latter half of a term paper I wrote last fall. There are probably errors or inaccuracies.
The two things upon which all scriptural interpretation hangs, Augustine argues, are the “modus inveniendi quae intellegenda sunt et modus proferendi quae intellecta sunt.”[1] First the “mode of finding those that are to be understood” and second the “mode of bringing forward those that are understood.”[2] In other words, in interpreting scripture there is the understanding of the things said in scripture (the first mode) and the teaching of those things (the second mode). Because one cannot teach without first understanding, Augustine investigates understanding before teaching.[3] Now “all doctrine is of things or of signs, but things are learned through signs.”[4] When Augustine says that things are learned through signs, he most certainly does not mean to negate knowing a stone through sensing, but rather, is limiting himself to the coming to know of things by way of teaching.[5] Important is that “learning” does not mean any kind of ‘coming to know’ but signifies a certain kind of coming to know—through signs, i.e. things are learned, that is, they are made known through signs. It is possible that he refers to the inner word, of which he speaks in De Trinitate. More likely, Augustine could be referring to the second and third acts of the mind, judgment and reason, which occur through sign—through which acts things are learned from other things already understood. If the first interpretation is Augustine’s intention, then the sign itself makes the thing known, for the inner word is the very act of understanding. If the second, then he does not mean that the sign itself makes known what was not known, but that the signs in propositional conjunction with one another make another thing known.[6] Whichever the intention of Augustine, the force of his argument remains; understanding of things precedes understanding of sign, and therefore he investigates things before the signs of things.
Augustine writes that “we must be careful to remember that what is under consideration at this stage is the fact that things exist, not that they signify something else besides themselves.”[7] Too often, Augustine cautions, readers too quickly jump to the spiritual sense of scripture and do not consider what really is. And yet, Augustine is not so concerned to make sure the reader does his due diligence to understand the thing signified by words. He seems to think familiarity with one’s language and his fundamental distinction between thing and sign are enough for the reader to be able to approach the text of scripture—making only a passing comment: “[God] himself is not truly known by the sound of these two syllables [Deus], yet when the sound strikes the ear it leads all users of the Latin language to think a supremely excellent and immortal being.”[8] He is more concerned with the reader’s relationship, or willful disposition, towards things. Hence, there are three kinds of things, those “which are to be enjoyed, some which are to be used, and some whose function is both to enjoy and use.”[9] This 3-fold distinction of all things gives shape to our understanding of things and rightly orders the interrelations of all things, such that reality might be rightly interpreted. God is that “thing” which is to be enjoyed, man is that thing who enjoys and uses, and every other thing (including men—with a qualification) is to be used.
It is these two actions of man, love for the sake of the thing itself (enjoyment) and love for the sake of another (use), which make up the intellectual lens of reality. This distinction is learned through attention to the nature of all things—it is man’s nature to love good(s) either for itself or for the sake of another good. It is the nature of goods (things) to be loved either for their own sake or for the sake of another. That the nature of those things that exist are such is clear by natural reason; that man is at a loss at how to rightly order his affection towards various goods is also clear from nature.[10] It is in realizing the confused state of mankind that Augustine’s doctrine of scripture springs forward. Man has need of directing the whole of his life to the good of goods and is in dire need of a guide. Scripture, in its clearest passages (the greatest and second commandments) offers itself as that very guide. Augustine writes, “the fulfillment and end of the law and all the divine scriptures is to love the thing which must be enjoyed and the thing which together with us can enjoy that thing. To enlighten us and enable us, the whole temporal dispensation was set up by divine providence for our salvation.”[11] Scripture is to be used—but its use is unique. Scripture is a thing that through signs directs man unto salvation through love of God and neighbor. Having discerned the end of the whole of human life and that scripture is given to direct man to that end, Augustine argues that if anyone thinks “that he has understood the divine scriptures or any part of them, but cannot by his understanding build up this double love of God and neighbor,” then he “has not yet succeeded in understanding” the scriptures.[12] If a reader fails to demonstrate a passage’s full meaning but still derives something to support his love of God and love of neighbor, he has not made a fatal error—but it reveals that in veering off the path, he may indeed find himself in the wrong place at some time. It is this chance of fatal error that drives Augustine to investigate signs in book two.
For Augustine, there are two reasons why a text fails to be understood—the signs are either unknown, or they are ambiguous. Unknown signs can be remedied by study of language—and especially in scriptural studies, studying the Greek and Hebrew—or by the studying of various translations.[13] It is in his solution to unfamiliar expressions that the above defense of the necessity of knowledge of realities comes to clear fruition in reading Augustine. On what causes this unfamiliarity he writes, “Ignorance of things makes figurative expressions unclear when we are ignorant of the qualities of animals or stones or plants or other things mentioned in scripture for the sake of some analogy.”[14] After a brief exegesis of “to be wise as serpents” by considering the nature of snakes, Augustine continues,
“Just as knowledge of the habits of the snake clarifies the many analogies involving this animal regularly given in scripture, so too an ignorance of the numerous animals mentioned no less frequently in analogies is a great hindrance to understanding. The same is true of stones, herbs and anything that has roots. […] And because of their ignorance about hyssop many people, unaware of its power to cleanse the lungs or even (so it is said) to split rock with its roots, […] are quite unable to discover why it is said, ‘You will purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean’.[15]
It should be abundantly clear to the reader deeply familiar with scripture that it is full of allusions to natural things and their peculiar habits and qualities to communicate spiritual realities. Nor is it only knowledge of natural realities that Augustine thinks necessary but knowledge of number too. Indeed, “unfamiliarity with numbers makes unintelligible many things that are said figuratively and mystically in scripture.” [16] Other passages are “also made inaccessible and opaque by an ignorance of music.” Here Augustine cautions, “But we must not listen to the fictions of pagan superstition.”[17] Natural knowledge is true no matter where it is learned from, but we must beware the idolatry that often accompanies the doctrinal tradition of natural realities. Augustine writes, “A person who is a good and a true Christian should realize that truth belongs to his Lord, wherever it is found.”[18]
The natural knowledge Augustine has been analyzing here are the subjects that made up the classical education of the Roman world: Physics, Arithmetic, Astronomy, Music—he will later address Logic and Rhetoric. Believing this education to be necessary to make sense of much of scripture, he is deeply concerned to claim what is good and denounce what is evil in it. To this end, he determines to consider what pagan learning consists of. He holds that there are two kinds of learning pursued in pagan society “One consists of things which have been instituted by humans, the other consists of things already developed, or divinely instituted, which have been observed by them. Of those instituted by humans, some are superstitious, some not.”[19] Under these superstitious works are included magic, worshipping of idols, going back to bed if sneezing while putting on shoes, and astrology.[20] It is these institutions, in which men have made agreements with demons, that are to be most avoided. Other institutions were made with men, such as language, dress, and coingage, and these are to be wholeheartedly embraced by the Christian.[21] But other human institutions are not established by human agreement, rather they are discovered. “Some of these concern the physical senses, others concern the mind.” Throughout his analysis (and it continues with quite extensive examples), Augustine’s principle of use is front and center—through his discourse on sciences, servile arts, and liberal arts, it is not the natural use of these things that is up for debate but whether or not they are useful for the interpretation of scripture. And though not every man needs knowledge of navigation to act upon it, a passing understanding is commendable so that one is “not entirely unaware of what scripture wishes to convey when it includes figurative expressions based on these arts.”[22] But what Augustine is most concerned with is whether or not the study of these will build the reader of scripture up in love. Study of these subjects may be beneficial and worthwhile, but there is a great danger in falling prey to pride. Augustine gives these words of admonition to the young scholar who fears God and seeks “a life of true happiness.”
“Do not venture without due care into any branches of learning which are pursued outside the church of Christ, as if they were a means to attaining the happy life, but discriminate sensibly and carefully between them. […] As for the other branches of learning found in pagan society, apart from the study of things past or present which concern the bodily senses (including the production and experimentations of the practical arts) and the sciences of logic and number, I consider nothing useful here.”
Augustine’s “I consider nothing” is somewhat deceitful. History, the servile arts, and the classical 7 liberal arts (for which logic and number ought to be taken as a synechdoche for) together with the study of scripture (divine science) make up the entirety of what will become the medieval university curriculum and more.
It can be safely said that Augustine views the study of reality to be most necessary—in varying degrees of usefulness—to the study of scripture. Indeed, this brief study has barely scratched the surface on the relationship between understanding reality and interpreting scripture; for the most part we have left the application of these preliminary principles alone.[23] The study required to accomplish this level of exegesis successfully is monumentous, and when considering the work required, one begins to see why theology was the cap of medieval studies and not the beginning. In conclusion, we must return to the beginning of this paper. If man were unable to discern form from particulars, then he would be incapable of true understanding. He would not see the good in things nor see that all that is shares in the good. There would be no understanding nor desire for the good of every good and the very idea of God would be impossible. The end of scripture, which is to direct the affections of man, would be lost on a creature without a good to be directed to. Augustine’s admonition to study the nature of things should not strike fear in the reader of scripture, if only he keep this one thing in mind: that his one chief end in all study, life, and being is to enjoy the good of every good thing.
[1]Augustine, De Doctrina, 1.1, Latin—https://www.augustinus.it/latino/dottrina_cristiana/index2.htm
[2] My translation.
[3] This paper will only be concerned with the first mode.
[4] Augustine, De Doctrina, 1.2 My translation.
[5] For more on the nature of teaching per se, see “On the Teacher,” Augustine’s dialogue with his teenage son.
[6] For example, from a certain triangle having 2 equal angles it is possible to learn that it also has 2 equal sides. (Euclid Book I Prop. 5)
[7] Augustine, On Christian Teaching, 9
[8] Ibid. 11. Brackets mine
Contra Van Til, who argues in “A Christian Theory of Knowledge” that Augustine (albeit allegedly inconsistently) uses a presuppositional hermeneutic with the Christian (and only “true”) God, Augustine vindicates himself from the grasp of 20th century garbage in this single sentence.
[9] Ibid. 9
[10] Even ignoring the wide variety of attempts throughout history to elucidate the good of all goods, that few men agree on the ordering of lower goods to one another is sufficient evidence for this claim.
[11] Ibid. 27
[12] Ibid. 27
[13] This is as much true for when a friend uses a big word, like, “mayonnaise,” and he has to explain what he meant. “
[14] Ibid. Pg 44
[15] Ibid. Pg 44-45
[16] Ibid. Pg 46
[17] Ibid. 46
[18] Ibid. 47
[19] Ibid. 47
[20] Ibid. 48-49
[21] Ibid. 54
[22] Ibid. 58
[23] A proper treatment of which would need a significantly more in depth paper.